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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents the results of the assessment study of two small-sized innovative reactors for electricity 
generation in Brazil using the methodology developed under the International Project on Innovative Nuclear 
Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO), co-ordinated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).     
INPRO was initiated in 2001 and has the main objective of helping to ensure that nuclear energy is available to 
contribute in a sustainable manner to the energy needs of the 21st century. Brazil joined the project since its 
beginning and in 2005 submitted a proposal for the assessment using INPRO methodology of two small-sized 
reactors (IRIS and FBNR) as potential components of an innovative nuclear energy system (INS) completed by 
a conventional open nuclear fuel cycle.  The assessment study was restricted to the reactor component of the 
INS and to the methodology areas of economics, proliferation resistance and reactor safety.  The results indicate 
that both IRIS and FBNR innovative designs comply mostly with the basic principles of the areas assessed and 
have potential to comply with the remaining ones. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent studies conducted by the Energetic Research Company of the Ministry of Mines and 
Energy predict an expansion of about 5,300 MWe in Brazil’s nuclear-electricity installed-
capacity in the next twenty-five years [1].  A first step towards this goal was taken by the 
National Council for Energy Policy on June 2007 with the approval of the re-start of the 
construction of the 1,350 MWe Angra 3 Unit, a conventional KWU/Siemens PWR design.  
Advanced (evolutionary and innovative) nuclear power plants designs and associated fuel 
cycles are now being considered for future deployment, including but limited to pressurised 
water reactor technology and improved once-through nuclear fuel cycle with no reprocessing. 
 
The International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel cycles – INPRO – 
launched by IAEA in 2000 offers a methodology for the holistic assessment of innovative 
nuclear energy systems (INS) composed of nuclear power plants and associated nuclear fuel 
cycles together with all related infrastructure. INPRO also serves as a forum to bring together 
technology holders and technology users to consider jointly the research and development 
actions necessary to bring the desired innovations into reality [2].  Brazil joined INPRO since 
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its initial stages and participated in the project Phase 1B by performing the assessment of two 
small-sized innovative nuclear reactors – the International Reactor Innovative and Secure 
(IRIS) and the Fixed Bed Nuclear Reactor (FBNR) – using INPRO methodology.  The 
reactors were assessed independently as part of an innovative nuclear energy system (INS) 
completed by an indigenous once-through fuel-cycle with enriched uranium oxide and no 
reprocessing requirements. The scope of the assessment was limited to the reactor component 
of the INS and to the areas of reactor safety and economics for IRIS, and reactor safety and 
proliferation resistance for the FBNR reactor.  The IRIS reactor was assessed by experts from 
the CNEN’s research institutes, CDTN, IPEN and IEN. The FBNR reactor was assessed by 
experts from the UFRGS.  The objective of this paper is to summarise the main results of the 
assessment study performed.  
  
 
2. OUTLINE OF INPRO METHODOLOGY 
  
The INPRO methodology [3] has been developed for screening an innovative nuclear system 
(INS), for comparing different INSs to find a preferred one consistent with the sustainable 
development of a given State, and for identifying the research, development and 
demonstration needed to improve the performance of existing components of an INS and/or 
to develop new components.  An INS encompasses all nuclear facilities of the front and back 
end of a nuclear fuel cycle, i.e., mining/milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, 
reactor, reprocessing and materials management (including transportation, storage and waste 
management), together with all related infrastructure measures. 
 
The INPRO methodology identifies a set of basic principles (BPs), user requirements (URs) 
and criteria (CRs) in a hierarchical manner as the basis for the assessment of a INS. The 
highest level in the INPRO hierarchy is BP, which is a statement of a general goal that is to be 
achieved in an INS.  The second level is a UR that sets out the measures to be taken (mostly 
by the designers/developers but also by owners/operators and government institutions) to 
meet the general goal of the corresponding BP.  On the third level of hierarchy, to verify 
whether the UR have been properly met, the assessor of the INS uses a CR with associated 
indicators (INs) and acceptance limits (ALs).  All indicators have, in principle, the same 
relative importance but the assessor can apply a weighting method for aggregation of the 
indicators, if he so wishes.  
 
INPRO takes a holistic approach to assess INSs in seven areas namely, economics, safety, 
waste management, environment, proliferation resistance, physical protection and 
infrastructure. The BPs of the areas considered in this study are indicated below. Detailed 
discussion of the corresponding URs, CRs and ALs can be found in Ref. [3].  
 
Economic Basic Principle BP1: Energy and related products and services from innovative 
nuclear energy systems shall be affordable and available. 
 
Proliferation resistance BP1: Proliferation resistance intrinsic features and extrinsic 
measures shall be implemented throughout the full life cycle for innovative nuclear energy 
systems to help ensure that INSs will continue to be an unattractive means to acquire fissile 
material for a nuclear weapons program. Both intrinsic features and extrinsic measures are 
essential, and neither can be considered sufficient by itself.   
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Safety BP1: Installations of an INS shall incorporate enhanced defence-in-depth as a part of 
their fundamental safety approach and ensure that the levels of protection in defence-in-depth 
shall be more independent from each other than in existing installations. 
 
Safety BP2: Installations of an INS shall excel in safety and reliability by incorporating into 
their designs, when appropriate, increased emphasis on inherently safe characteristics and 
passive systems as a part of their fundamental safety approach. 
 
Safety BP3: Installations of an INS shall ensure that the risk from radiation exposures to 
workers, the public and the environment during construction/commissioning, operation, and 
decommissioning, are comparable to the risk from other industrial facilities used for similar 
purposes.  
 
Safety BP4: The development of INS shall include associated research, development and 
demonstration work to bring the knowledge of plant characteristics and the capability of 
analytical methods used for design and safety assessment to at least the same confidence level 
as for existing plants.  
 
 
3. DESCRIPTION OF THE INS CHOSEN 
 
Brazil employs nuclear power since the 80’s, with the operation of its first nuclear power 
plant, Angra 1, a 657 MWe PWR Unit of Westinghouse design.  The country has an existing 
nuclear power infrastructure, including institutional measures, and possesses large reserves of 
uranium and thorium. Currently, Brazil operates, besides Angra 1, a second larger nuclear 
power unit, Angra 2, a 1350 MWe PWR of Siemens/KWU design, and dominates the 
technology of all phases of the nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment. The government is 
now considering the construction of an industrial unit for the uranium conversion phase to 
complete the whole indigenous production chain of the nuclear fuel cycle. This infrastructure 
was taken into account when selecting the following INS for assessment: 
 
Full INS structure: 
Advanced thermal reactor with open fuel cycle based on enriched uranium. 
 
Nuclear reactor technology:  
Advanced pressurised water reactor PWR technology, with innovative features. Selected INS 
nuclear reactor components:  International Reactor Innovative and Secure – IRIS and Fixed 
Bed Nuclear Reactor – FBNR. 
 
Nuclear fuel cycle technology:  
All indigenous nuclear capacity and facilities available, including uranium mining and 
milling, uranium conversion, uranium enrichment, fuel fabrication, electricity generation and 
waste management facilities. Waste storage facilities are considered part of the nuclear power 
plant, but waste disposal facilities are not taken into account. 
 
3.1. Overview description of the IRIS reactor 
 
IRIS [4-6] is a modular, small power (335 MWe per module), pressurised water reactor that 
utilises an integral reactor coolant system layout and a conventional refuelling scheme.  
While firmly based on the proven light water reactor (LWR) technology, the IRIS project has 
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introduced many engineering and project innovations that define its unique characteristics, as 
claimed by its designers, such as: a safety-by-design™ approach, which aims at eliminating 
by design the possibility for an accident to occur, rather than dealing with its consequences; 
enhanced and easier to implement security, based on its design characteristics; enhanced 
proliferation resistance  through extended refuelling cycle, while retaining use of current 
demonstrated fuel, facilitating international safeguards; and economic gains, through 
simplicity, modularity, and economy of serialisation instead of economy of scale. For 
illustration the integrated primary system design of IRIS is briefly described next: 
 
The Integral Reactor Coolant System 
 
IRIS employs an integrated primary system that incorporates all main primary circuit 
components within a single vessel, i.e., the core with control rods and their drive 
mechanisms, eight helical coil steam generators with eight associated fully-immersed axial 
flow pumps, and a pressurizer (see Figure 1). This integral reactor vessel arrangement 
eliminates the individual component pressure vessels and large connecting loop piping 
between them, resulting in a more compact configuration and in the elimination of the large 
loss-of-coolant accident as a design basis event.   Water flows upward through the core and 
then through the riser region (defined by the extended core barrel). At the top of the riser, the 
coolant is directed into the upper part of the annular plenum between the extended core barrel 
and the reactor vessel inside wall, where the suction of the reactor coolant pumps is located. 
Eight coolant pumps are employed, and the flow from each pump is directed downward 
through its associated helical coil steam generator module. The primary flow path continues 
down through the annular downcomer region outside the core to the lower plenum and then 
back to the core completing the circuit. The IRIS integral vessel is larger than a traditional 
PWR pressure vessel, but the size of the IRIS containment is a fraction of the size of 
corresponding loop reactors, resulting in a significant reduction in the overall size of the 
reactor plant.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  IRIS integral layout 
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3.2. Overview description of the FBNR reactor 
 
FBNR [7,8] is a small power reactor (70 MWe) without the need of onsite refuelling.  It 
utilises well proven PWR technology and has the characteristics of being simple in design, 
modular, inherently safe, passively cooled, proliferation resistant and causes reduced adverse 
environmental impact. 
The FBNR has a fuel chamber located below the core.  The fuel chamber is to be fuelled in 
the factory.  The fuel chamber in sealed form is then transported to and from the site. 
Therefore, there is no need for onsite refuelling.  The reactor uses PWR technology and has 
an integrated primary system design.  The 15 diameter spherical fuel elements are made of 
UO2 microspheres embedded in zirconium matrix and cladded by zircaloy. For illustration, 
the integrated primary system design of FBNR is briefly described below: 
 
The Integral Reactor Coolant System 
 
The reactor as shown in the schematic Figure 2 have in its upper part the reactor core and a 
steam generator and in its lower part the fuel chamber.  The core consists of two concentric 
perforated zircaloy tubes of 31 cm and 172 cm in diameters inside which, during the reactor 
operation, the spherical fuel elements are held together by the forced coolant flow in a fixed 
bed configuration forming a suspended core.  The reserve fuel chamber is a 30 cm diameter 
tube made of high neutron absorbing alloy, which is directly connected underneath the core 
tube. The fuel chamber consists of a helical 40 cm diameter tube flanged to the reserve fuel 
chamber that is sealed by the national and international authorities. A piston type core limiter 
adjusts the core height and controls the amount of fuel elements that are permitted to enter the 
core from the reserve chamber.  A grid is provided at the lower part of the tube to hold the 
fuel elements within it.  A control rod can slide inside the centre of the core for fine reactivity 
adjustments. The reactor is provided with a pressurizer system to keep the coolant at a 
constant pressure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  FBNR integral layout 
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The pump circulates the water coolant inside the reactor moving it vertically up into the inner 
perforated tube and then, passing horizontally through the fuel elements and the outer 
perforated tube, enters the outer shell where it flows up vertically to the shell-and-tube type 
steam generator integrated in the upper part of the module. Thereafter, the coolant flows back 
down to the pump through the concentric annular passage. At a flow velocity called terminal 
velocity, the water coolant carries the fuel elements from the fuel chamber up into the core.  
A fixed suspended core is thus formed in the reactor. The long-term reactivity is supplied by 
fresh fuel addition and boron poisoning of the moderator. A fine control rod may be provided 
to move in the centre of the core that can control the short-term reactivity. In the shut down 
condition, the suspended core breaks down and the fuel elements leave the core and fall back 
into the fuel chamber by the force of gravity. 
 
The control system is conceived to have the pump in the “not operating” condition and only 
operates when all the signals coming from the control detectors simultaneously indicate safe 
operation.  Any signal from any of the detectors, due to any initiating accident event, will cut-
off the power to the pump, causing the fuel elements to leave the core and fall back into the 
fuel chamber by the force of gravity, where they remain in a highly subcritical and passively 
cooled condition. The fuel chamber is cooled by natural convection transferring heat to the 
water in the tank housing the fuel chamber. The water flowing from an accumulator, which is 
controlled by a multi-redundancy valve system, cools the fuel chamber functioning as the 
emergency core cooling system.  
 
3.3. Reference reactor – Angra 2 
 
The application of INPRO methodology requires verification of the compliance of the values 
of the indicators with the corresponding acceptance limits (ALs).  Some of the ALs in the 
current version of INPRO methodology have been defined as superior to existing designs 
(currently operating plants may refer to a set of plants which are currently under operation 
and are defined to be the most representative within their category).   
 
For reasons of availability and access to the design data needed for the study, the Angra 2 
NPP, located near the city of Angra dos Reis, was selected as the reference reactor.  
Designers of the plant and containment were KWU Group of Siemens Aktiengesell-schaft 
(today Framatone ANP), and Nuclebrás Engenharia S.A. – Nuclen, today Eletrobrás 
Termonuclear S.A. – Eletronuclear, Rio de Janeiro [9]. 
 
4. SUMMARY RESULTS OF THE ASSESSMENT 
 
The results of the assessment of the IRIS and FBNR reactors using INPRO methodology are 
summarised next.  Both reactors were initially assessed with regard to safety of the nuclear 
power plant.   IRIS was further assessed with regard to Economics and the FBNR reactor for 
Proliferation Resistance. The results are summarised in accordance with the terminology 
introduced in the Head Chapter of INPRO Manual [3]: if the value of the indicator is 
acceptable, the judgement is that the INS complies with or has potential to fulfil the specific 
criterion assessed.  Otherwise, the judgement becomes non-compliant or no potential for this 
criterion. This judgement procedure is repeated likewise for all criteria of a user requirement, 
then for all user requirements of a basic principle and finally for all basic principles of a 
methodology area. The rationale for each judgement is documented in full detail in the Refs. 
[10-11].  
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4.1. Economic Assessment of the IRIS reactor 
 
The objective was to perform a fast evaluation of the potential economic competitiveness of 
the IRIS reactor to contribute to the expansion of the nuclear-electricity installed-capacity in 
Brazil between 2005-2030. The reference scenario in the National Plan of Energy 2030 [1] 
indicated that new 5,345 MWe of nuclear origin should be deployed in the country during 
this 25 years period.  After the expected start of operation in 2013 of Angra 3 NPP, a 1,350 
MWe KWU/Siemens design plant twin to Angra 2 unit, four other units of about 1,000 MWe 
each shall be deployed at an average time interval of five years. 
 
To fulfil this energy scenario, a plant arrangement of three independent IRIS reactor single 
units of 335 MWe each, equivalent to a total installed capacity of 1005 MWe, to start full 
operation in 2020, is assessed here.  This plant arrangement is based on the assumption that 
the three units would be constructed in series in a “slide-along” manner. Thus, the units 
would be started up in sequence as construction, pre-operation testing, fuel load and start-up 
testing are all completed for a unit.  The units will be spaced sufficiently apart so that the first 
completed unit could be operated while construction of the subsequent one is still in progress. 
As an alternative to the deployment of the IRIS three single-units site arrangement, a large 
unit, similar to Angra 3, was considered in this study in order to exploit the recent feasibility 
studies performed by Eletronuclear for approval of the completion of Angra 3 construction. 
 
With regard to the nuclear fuel cycle, the INS proposed considers that all the different 
elements of the once-through (OT) fuel cycle will be bought from the internal market.  
However, since some stages of the fuel cycle (namely, conversion and enrichment) are not 
fully commercially available in the country at the time of preparing this report, a different 
approach was followed for the nuclear options assessed.  For IRIS, the fuel cycle costs were 
determined from the international market, whereas for the Angra 3 reactor type the fuel costs 
for operating the twin Angra 2 unit were used.  These latter costs are a combination of the 
costs of the fuel cycle services (milling, mining, reconversion and fabrication) already 
provided by the Brazilian Nuclear Industries (INB) and those services (conversion and 
enrichment) contracted in the international market.  For better comparison with the reference 
date for the reactor system costs, most of the fuel cycle costs are in US$ of December 2004.  
 
Under these assumptions, 6 out of 8 indicators of the economics area are acceptable (75%) 
and 2 others have potential to be acceptable (25%) (Table 1).  Of the 3 user requirements 
considered, the first two on cost of energy (UR1) and ability to finance (UR2) are acceptable 
and the third one, on risk of investment (UR3) has high potential to be acceptable.  From 
these results, it follows that IRIS design has potential to comply with the BP (energy 
affordability and availability) of the economics area. 
 
Table 1.  Indicators and judgement of potential of INS: Economics area – IRIS [10] 
 
BP UR Indicators  Judgement of Potential 
1 IN1.1 Compliant 
2 IN2.1/EP2.1.1, IN2.1/EP2.1.2, IN2.2 Compliant 
IN3.1, IN 3.2 Potential 
 
 
1 
3 
IN3.3, IN 3.4 Compliant 
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4.2. Safety assessment of the IRIS reactor 
 
IRIS design includes innovative safety features and provides for multiple levels of defence 
for accident prevention and mitigation (defence-in-depth).  Because of the safety by design 
approach, the number and complexity of these passive safety systems and the required 
operator actions are further minimised.  Thus, it is anticipated that its safety assessment 
by INPRO methodology, which includes the evaluation of 4 basic principles, 14 user 
requirements and 38 numerical or logical indicators, should be quite favourable. In fact, the 
assessment results show that the values of 31 out of the 38 indicators are acceptable (82%) 
and 4 others have potential to be acceptable (11%). One indicator has yet to be evaluated 
(analyses and/or experiments have yet to be performed) and 2 indicators were found non-
applicable (Table 2). 
 
Table 2.  BPs, URs, INs and judgement of potential of INS: Safety area – IRIS [10] 
 
BP UR Indicators  Judgement of Potential 
IN1.1.1, IN1.1.3, IN1.1.4, IN1.1.5, 
IN1.1.6  
Compliant 
1 
IN1.1.2 Potential 
2 IN1.2.1 Compliant 
3 
IN1.3.1, IN1.3.2, IN1.3.3, IN1.3.4, 
IN13.5., IN1.3.6 
Compliant 
4 IN1.4.1, IN1.4.2, IN1.4.3 Compliant 
5 IN1.5.1, IN1.5.2, IN1.5.3 Compliant 
6 IN1.6.1 Compliant 
IN1.7.1 Potential 
 
 
 
 
1 
7 
IN1.7.2 Compliant 
2 1 IN2.1.1, IN2.1.2, IN2.1.3,IN2.1.4 Compliant 
1 IN3.1.1 Compliant 
3 2 IN3.2.1 Potential 
1 IN4.1.1, IN4.1.2, IN4.1.3 Compliant 
IN4.2.1 Potential 
IN4.2.2 Compliant 2 
IN4.2.3 Non applicable 
IN4.3.1 Compliant 
3 
IN4.3.2 Non applicable 
IN4.4.1 Compliant 
 
 
 
4 
4 
IN4.4.2 To be judged 
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From the indicators results, it follows that IRIS design complies with 5 out of  7 of the URs 
of BP1 (enhanced defence-in-depth); complies fully with the BP2 (inherent safety and 
reliability); and has high potential to comply with BP3 (risk of radiation) and BP4 (Research, 
Development and Demonstration) of the reactor safety area. 
 
4.3. Proliferation resistance of the FBNR reactor 
 
FBNR is a small reactor without on-site refueling without any fresh and spent fuel being 
stored at the site for a long time during its service life.   It also ensured difficult unauthorized 
access to fuel during the whole period of its presence at the site and during transportation, 
and design provisions are taken to facilitate the implementation of safeguards.  FBNR will be 
factory produced and fueled and brought back to the factory for refueling after its fuel 
lifetime expires.  FBNR fuel chambers are fabricated, fueled, and sealed in the factory under 
the supervision of the IAEA safeguard program.  The fuel chamber is taken to the site and 
installed in the reactor and will return to the factory sealed for refueling. 
 
The 15 mm diameter spherical fuel elements are stored in the reactor’s fuel chamber.  The 
fuel elements, through the flow of coolant, move up into the reactor core when the reactor is 
in operation.  Under a reactor shut-down or any accident condition, the fuel elements fall out 
of the core by the force of gravity and become stored in the fuel chamber and remain in 
subcritical and passively cooled conditions.  The fuel chamber is made of a helical tube 
having a grid in its lower part and a flange in the upper part.  The fuel chamber is flanged to 
the reactor and sealed by the safeguard authorities. 
 
The non-proliferation-characteristics of FBNR are thus based on both extrinsic measures and 
the intrinsic concept of isotope denaturing.  Based on the extrinsic measures and the reactor 
intrinsic features, it is envisaged that FBNR is a foolproof reactor against nuclear 
proliferation. The diversion of fuel is obviously impossible when the reactor is operation; 
therefore, care must be taken only during refuelling.  The procedure involves bringing the 
fuelled fuel chamber from the factory to the site and (1) connect the fuel chamber to the 
reactor, (2) seal the flange by the safeguard authorities, (3) have a camera focused on the seal, 
and programs it to film only when the reactor is shut down.  This procedure should assure the 
safeguard of the nuclear fuel.  The shielding requirements of the FBNR fuel chamber for its 
transportation from the site to the factory (and vice versa) for refuelling present no extra 
burden in comparison with those for transportation of spent nuclear fuel from other reactors. 
 
The results of the assessment indicate that all indicators are acceptable. The FBNR design 
complies with the 5 URs and the BP of the INPRO proliferation resistance area (Table 3). 
  
Table 3.  BP, URs, INs and judgement of potential of INS: Prolif. Resist. – FBNR [10] 
 
BP UR Indicators  Judgement of Potential 
1 IN1.1, IN1.2, Compliant 
2 IN2.1, IN2.2, IN2.3, IN2.4 Compliant 
3 IN3.1, IN3.2, IN3.3, IN3.4, IN3.5, 
IN3.6 
Compliant 
4 IN4.1, IN4.2 Compliant 
 
 
1 
5 IN5.1, IN5.2, IN5.3 Compliant 
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4.4. Safety assessment of the FBNR reactor 
 
With regard to the reactor safety area, the assessments results show that the values of only 29 
out of 38 indicators are acceptable (76%) and 9 others have potential to be acceptable (24%). 
The relatively high percentage of acceptable results in the performed judgement reflects that, 
despite the project’s low level of maturity (conceptual stage), the FBNR innovative design is 
compliant with most of the BPs of the reactor safety area of INPRO methodology (Table 4). 
  
Table 4.  BPs, URs, INs and judgement of potential of INS: Safety area – FBNR [10] 
 
BP UR Indicators  Judgement of Potential 
1 
IN1.1.1, IN1.1.2, IN1.1.3, IN1.1.4, 
IN1.1.5, IN1.1.6  
Compliant 
2 IN1.2.1 Compliant 
3 IN1.3.1, IN1.3.2, IN1.3.3, IN1.3.4, IN13.5., IN1.3.6 
Compliant 
IN1.4.1 Potential 
4 
IN1.4.2, IN1.4.3 Compliant 
IN1.5.1, IN1.5.2 Potential 
5 
IN1.5.3 Compliant 
6 IN1.6.1 Potential 
IN1.7.1 Compliant 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
7 
IN1.7.2 Potential 
2 1 IN2.1.1, IN2.1.2, IN2.1.3,IN2.1.4 Compliant 
1 IN3.1.1 Compliant 
3 2 IN3.2.1 Compliant 
1 IN4.1.1, IN4.1.2, IN4.1.3 Compliant 
IN4.2.1 Potential 
2 IN4.2.2, IN4.2.3 Potential 
IN4.3.1 Compliant 
3 
IN4.3.2 Potential 
 
 
 
4 
4 IN4.4.1, IN4.4.2 Compliant 
 
 
From the indicators results, it follows that FBNR design complies with 3 out of 7 of the user 
requirements of BP1 (enhanced defence-in-depth); complies fully with the BP2 (inherent  
safety and reliability) and BP3 (risk of radiation) and has potential to comply with BP4 
(research, development and demonstration). 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this work the results of the assessment study using INPRO methodology performed on   
two small sized reactors as alternatives components of a INS completed with a open fuel 
cycle based on enriched uranium has been presented.  
 
For IRIS, the high percentage of acceptable results for the indicators reflects the maturity of 
this reactor design (preliminary licensing stage). Overall these results indicate that IRIS 
innovative design already complies mostly with the BPs of the reactor safety area and fully 
with the BP of the economics area.  
 
For FBNR, concerning the reactor safety area, the relatively high percentage of acceptable 
results reflects the fact that, despite the project’s low level of maturity (conceptual stage), its 
innovative design already complies with most of the BPs of this area and has potential to 
comply with the remaining ones.  Regarding the proliferation resistance area, the assessment 
results indicate the FBNR design complies fully with BP of this area. 
 
A natural follow-up action would be the extension of the study to the remaining INPRO areas 
not covered in this first exercise but no steps have been taken in this direction up to now. 
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